This article offers an analysis of the objective, substance and political implications of EC visa facilitation and readmission agreements. These agreements have gained increasing importance in EU foreign policy making because the EU has started to view visa facilitation regimes not only as a necessary incentive for the signing of a readmission agreement, but also as a means for mitigating the negative side-effects of the Eastern Enlargement. In offering more relaxed travel conditions in exchange for endorsement of an EC readmission agreement and reforms in domestic justice and home affairs, the EU found a new way to pressure for reforms in neighbouring countries while meeting a major source of discontent in these countries. The analysis considers the broader implications of these agreements and argues that even if the facilitated travel opportunities are beneficial for the citizens of the target countries, the positive achievements are undermined by the Schengen enlargement which requires that the new member states tighten up their borders to their neighbours.
1.

Introduction
In recent years the instrument of EC readmission agreements has attracted a great deal of scholarly attention (cf. Roig and Huddelston 2007 , Schiefer 2003 , Rogers and Peers 2005 , Schieffer 2003 , Kruse 2006 , Bouteillet-Pacquet 2003 . The signing of a readmission agreement was considered to be dependent on certain incentives, most notably on visa facilitation. However, the use of visa facilitation as an incentive to sign readmission agreements was seen as rather limited in scope, since "some Member States hesitate to close a door on irregular immigration to open a window on new potential irregular flows of visa overstayers, already the largest group of irregular migrants in the EU. […] In other words, coupling is a limited policy tool that Member States will allow the Commission to employ in 'exceptional cases'" (Roig and Huddelston 2007: 377) . This paper argues that this assumption may not necessarily prove true for one major reason. The EU has started to view visa facilitation regimes not only as a necessary incentive for the signing of a readmission agreement but also as a means for mitigating the negative side effects of the Eastern Enlargement. In the context of their accession process to the EU, the Central and Eastern European countries were expected to introduce new visa requirements for their Eastern neighbours located on the EU's negative visa list, including all Western Balkan states (with the exception of Croatia), Russia, Ukraine and other CIS countries. This conditionality requirement was particularly difficult, as it led to the end of the liberalised movement of persons in the region. The imposition of the visa requirements between the new member states and their Eastern neighbours has therefore created a new dividing line in Europe and reinforced the picture in neighbouring states that the EU is establishing a 'fortress Europe'.
Against this background, the instrument of EC visa facilitation and readmission agreements gained importance in EU foreign policy making. These agreements were considered to be beneficial to both sides. They provide the EU with a strong lever to make third countries sign a readmission agreement and increase the reform efforts in their domestic justice and home affairs sector, while they also meet major grievances of the neighbouring countries by easing the tight visa regime and fostering facilitated travel opportunities for bona fide travellers. EC visa facilitation and readmission agreements gradually moved to the centre of the EU's efforts to balance internal security concerns and external stabilisation needs in the neighbourhood.
By elaborating on the EU's strategy regarding visa facilitation and readmission, this paper aims to offer the systematic analysis of the substance, the objective and the political implications of these agreements. The analysis establishes when the connection between readmission and visa facilitation was made and presents the importance of EC visa facilitation and readmission agreements for the EU's relations with the Western Balkan countries as well as the European Neighbourhood Policy. EC visa facilitation and readmission agreements have already been concluded with the Western Balkan countries, Ukraine, Moldova and the Russian Federation, and they may eventually become a standard foreign policy instrument of the European Neighbourhood Policy.
The second part of the article assesses these agreements in terms of similarities and differences. The analysis concludes by clarifying the broader implications of the EC visa facilitation and readmission agreements and arguing that even if the facilitated travel opportunities are beneficial for the citizens of the target countries, the positive achievements are undermined by the Schengen enlargement, which makes the new member states tighten up their border to those of their neighbours.
EC visa facilitation and readmission agreements: balancing internal security and external stabilisation
This section introduces the gradual coupling of the negotiations on EC readmission agreements with the incentive of visa facilitation and presents the growing importance of EC visa facilitation and readmission agreements for the EU's relations with neighbouring countries.
Linking readmission to visa facilitation
Negotiations on EC readmission agreements started in 2001, after the Amsterdam treaty had transferred the competence to conclude readmission agreements with third countries to the European Union. 1 Shortly thereafter it became clear that successful negotiations would take longer than the member states had originally hoped, because the agreements mainly bring about negative consequences and difficult challenges of varying dimensions for countries of origin or transit. In 2002, member states started calling for the speeding-up of ongoing readmission negotiations -a claim which has been reiterated at every opportunity ever since. 2 Gradually it became clear that concessions needed to be made, and more-attractive packages would have to be linked to migration policy. In the months that followed, visa facilitation became the major compensation matter introduced by third countries in negotiations with the EU. In the Western Balkans, the EU linked the relaxation of the visa regime not only to the signing of an EC readmission agreements but also, more broadly, to "implementing major reforms in areas such as the strengthening of the rule of law, combating organised crime, corruption and illegal migration, and strengthening their administrative capacity in border control and security in documents" ( The figure above shows that even though, theoretically, each neighbouring state may conclude an EC visa facilitation and readmission agreement, their concrete actions in this field differ. In the visa domain, the clauses are most often rather vague, referring to commonplaces such as "establishing constructive dialogues" or "exchange views". In its "common approach on visa liberalisation", the EU specified the concrete factors that impact on the decision to open negotiations:
whether an readmission agreement is in place or under negotiations; external relations objectives; implementation record of existing bilateral agreements and progress on related issues in the area of justice, freedom and security (e.g. border management, document security, migration and asylum, fight against terrorism […] , organised crime and corruption); and security concerns, migratory movement and the impact of the visa facilitation agreement (quoted in Commission of the European Communities 2008b: 2)
The Commission suggested that three countries in particular meet these pre-conditions:
Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan (Ibid: 9).
The content and implications of EC visa facilitation and readmission agreements
This section analysis the EC visa facilitation and readmission agreements in terms of substance and implications. They are considered in relation to each other and systematically assessed in terms of their similarities and differences.
The content of EC visa facilitation agreements
This section evaluates the visa facilitation agreements concluded with Serbia ( The agreements fix the fee for processing visa applications of all citizens of the target country at €35. In the EC visa facilitation agreements with Russia and Ukraine, a clause adds that the fees increase to €70, if the request is urgent (3 days before departure). However, there are some exceptions to this stipulation e.g. close relatives, pupils and students will continue to pay the reduced fee of €35 even if the request is urgent.
5
The EC visa facilitation agreements waive the visa fee for certain categories of citizens. The least comprehensive agreement in this respect is the EC-Russian visa facilitation agreement, followed by the ones with Ukraine and Moldova. The agreements intend to make the procedures for issuing short stay visas more transparent. More detailed information regarding the procedures and conditions for applying for visas and on their validity shall be given. The visa facilitation agreement with Moldova is the only one that declares the intention to improve the EU presence in the country and set up a common application centre in Chisinau. 6 The visa facilitation agreements with the Western Balkans end by acknowledging their intention to "give a wider definition to the notion of family members that should benefit from visa facilitation". The wish particularly concerns siblings and their children.
The implications on the visa facilitation side
In terms of substance, the EC visa facilitation agreements with the Western Balkans are the most comprehensive. They contain the clearest statement regarding visa-free travel and more categories of citizens that benefit from facilitated travel, including tourists in particular. The EC-Russian visa facilitation agreement is at the other end of the scale. The benefit of all EC visa facilitation agreements is that they fix the processing fee all visa applications at €35, and to waive the fees for certain categories of persons. There is one measure, however, that should explicitly prevent the negative side effects of the Schengen Eastern Enlargement: the establishment of local border traffic regimes. The issuing of 'local border traffic permits' for border residents is an important measure for fostering neighbourly relations between border regions at the EU's external borders. The local border traffic concerns residents living within a border zone of 50 km and authorises them to move freely in the border zones of both countries. Due to this set-up, however, the local border traffic regime could potentially end up affecting only a comparatively small number of citizens in a closely circumscribed area. On the Ukrainian border with Poland, the local border traffic may only include one larger town, Uzhhorod, with more than 100,000 inhabitants (Boratynski et al. 2006b: 3) . It is also worth mentioning that residents of border regions often search for other, more 7 The scholars draw this conclusion by assessing the EC-Ukraine visa facilitation agreement. The waiving of visa fees for certain parts of the population, the speedier processing of the visa application (normally 10 calendar days), the possibility of multiple-entry visas for certain categories of people and a shorter list of documents required are the other plus points of the EC visa facilitation agreements. The visa procedures, including the length of the visa application procedure and the long list of documents required, were often perceived as troublesome and lacking in transparency.
According to an EU visa policy survey of eight EU member states in four Eastern
European countries (Boratynski et al. 2006a) , the length of procedures differed considerably among the EU member states. The average processing time ranged from two days in the case of Poland, over eight days in Germany and up to 14 days in the Czech Republic. Moreover, the consular practices on how to issue a short stay visa equally differed among EU member states. Applicants were frequently required to wait in queues for hours and did not receive reliable information on which documents were needed. If a document was missing, applicants were expected to return with the missing document in person. Usually consulates do not accept documents sent by post or e-mail, implying that the applicant has to come again. As the relevant consulate is usually a long distance from the applicant's place of residence (according to the EU visa policy monitoring survey (2006a: 18), the average distance to the closest consulate was 300 km) the numerous visits may prove to be costly and burdensome. Even Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn (2006) admitted that getting a Schengen visa could therefore be a "bureaucratic and costly nightmare". The EC visa facilitation agreements explicitly aim at making these bureaucratic routines less cumbersome and more transparent, notably through the newly installed joint committee. The joint committee is in charge of suggesting amendments or additions to the agreement and providing for its smooth implementation. Therefore the committee may assume an important role in ensuring fair and transparent visa application procedures. The smooth implementation of the agreement is of particular relevance in view of visa liberalisation as a long-term objective.
The EC visa facilitation agreements have one major disadvantage, however. They divide the society of the target country into two groups the privileged few who can get a multiple-entry visa, benefit from the simplified procedure […] , or profit from the waiving of the application fee for the visa, and as to the remainder: the vast majority of ordinary citizens who cannot enjoy such advantages. This can create a feeling of discrimination and lead to the conclusion that the European Union is interested only in the […] elite (Boratynski et al. 2006b : 2).
A self-evident implication of this separation is that the non-privileged citizens may try to obtain the same advantages as the privileged ones, possibly leading to an increased level of corruption. Some may attempt using bribery to get the privileged status of, say, a journalist or a driver of international cargo.
Furthermore, the visa facilitation agreements draw not only a distinction within the society of the target country but also within the ENP region. The EU's strategy of offering facilitated travel opportunities to neighbours on a case-by-case basis might undermine the ENP as a global strategy towards all neighbours (Boniface et al. 2008: 23) . What is more, it risks unintended consequences with regard to those neighbouring
countries not yet provided with visa facilitation. The EU-Russia visa facilitation agreement, for instance, has a negative effect on the territorial reintegration of the breakaway provinces of Georgia, as it provides Georgian citizens living in South- 
The content of EC readmission agreements
Readmission agreements generally cover procedural provisions regarding return procedure, transit return arrangements, responsibility criteria, standard of proof, time limits and cost distribution, although the exact nature of these procedures can vary
significantly. The most difficult issue to agree upon is the readmission of third country nationals and stateless persons. Contestable points arise in approving the travel route of these migrants, and in providing evidence that they transited the country before entering the EU's territory. Proof of nationality is highly critical, too. Other controversial technical issues include applicable time limits, the use of the EU standard travel document for expulsion, the means of evidence including prima facie evidence, and the use of charter flights (cf. Schieffer 2003: 354) . In addition, the relation between a new Community agreement and possibly existing bilateral agreements with individual member states will have to be assessed.
The European Commission pursues a standard approach in negotiating readmission agreements with third countries and seeks to achieve final texts that have as many common features as possible. The first drafts of the texts that the Commission transmits to its negotiation partners typically do not vary much. However, during negotiations, single adjustments are required according to the respective country's objections and demands, so ultimately, the agreements will differ.
The readmission agreements that the Community has signed so far with Albania, Bosnia, Hong Kong, Macao, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Russia, Serbia, Sri Lanka, and Ukraine, are divided into seven or eight sections with altogether 21 to 23
articles. The articles are as follows:
• Purpose of the agreement: rapid and effective procedures for identification and repatriation of persons who do not, or no longer, fulfil the conditions for entry, residence or presence;
• Definitions;
• Readmission obligations: covering own nationals, third country nationals and stateless persons;
• Readmission procedure: time limits, common application forms, means of evidence, transfer modalities, modes of transport;
• Transit operations: extent of support to be given by the requested state;
circumstances to refuse or revoke transit permission;
• Costs, data protection and non-affection of international rights and obligations;
• Implementation and practical application;
• Final provisions: entry into force, duration, termination, and legal status of annexes.
All agreements include several annexes regarding documents considered to be proof or prima facie evidence of nationality, and of proof or prima facie evidence of the conditions for readmission of third country nationals and stateless persons. Some of them also contain common statements regarding the meaning of the agreement for Denmark, Norway, and Iceland.
Besides this overall similar structure, substantial differences in the agreements exist:
• Readmission obligations of the signatories: Ukraine is the only country for which the agreement does not differentiate between the obligations of the Community and the obligations of the contracting state.
• Persons to be readmitted: The agreements with Bosnia, Macedonia, Moldova,
Montenegro and Serbia explicitly state that signatories shall also readmit any minor unmarried children of the person to be readmitted as well as spouses of another nationality, unless they have an independent right of residence. The agreements with Russia and Ukraine require readmission "irrespective of the will of the person to be readmitted".
• Readmission procedure: Several states (Macedonia, Moldova, Russia, Serbia, Ukraine) have introduced an accelerated procedure in case a person is apprehended in the border region after irregularly crossing the border directly from the territory of the requested state. In this case, the requesting state may submit a readmission application within two working days of this person's apprehension.
• Time limits: The time limit for submitting a readmission application varies between six (Moldova) and twelve (Albania) months. The time limit for replying to the application varies between 10 working days (Serbia) and 25 calendar days (Russia).
Possible extensions are between 2 working days (Moldova) and 60 calendar days (Russia). The requested validity of readmission travel documents lies between 30 days (Russia) and six months (Albania). The requesting state has to decide on a transit procedure within a certain time period, which varies between 4 (Moldova) and 10 (Ukraine) working days. For Russia, no time limit has been specified.
• Transit procedure: Ukraine is the only country that specifies conditions for escorts in case of transit of third-country nationals or stateless persons.
• Entry into force: The obligations concerning the readmission of third-country nationals and stateless persons defined in the agreements between the EC and Albania, Russia and Ukraine shall only apply after a certain transition period. For Albania and Ukraine, the transition period was agreed to last for two years after the agreement entered into force; in the case of Russia, the delegates agreed to a threeyear transition period. In contrast to the Albanian agreement, which was signed in 2005, the agreements for Russia and Ukraine signed in 2007 foresee that during the transition period, these obligations shall only be applicable to stateless persons and nationals from third-countries with which bilateral arrangements on readmission exist.
• 
The implications on the readmission side
Recently, the European Commission published a working document on "Preparing the next steps in border management in the European Union" containing national statistical data on refused entry, apprehension of irregular migrants, and removal. 9 However, since no common definitions exist and member states are not equally reliable in how they report data, we have to assume, that actual numbers are higher than indicated here.
Unfortunately, the data has not been subdivided into rejected asylum seekers and irregular migrants or into voluntary and forced return. Furthermore, we lack information on the country of destination upon removal and thus cannot rule out the possibility that substantial numbers were simply removed to another EU member state. The total numbers of removed aliens were distributed among member states as follows: Because of the above mentioned data limitations, it is very difficult for transit countries to estimate how many people will return after an EC readmission agreement takes effect. This leaves authorities in the dark with regard to necessary measures for the implementation of EC readmission agreements.
Generally, the problems transit countries face in view of EC readmission agreements relate to three different groups of people: a. their own state nationals; b.
third country nationals; c. asylum seekers.
Own State Nationals
As agreed in international customary law, each state is obliged to take back its own nationals. However, since most often the number of nationals from EU neighbouring countries who migrated irregularly to the EU is substantially high, their return creates major difficulties for the home country. First of all, remittances often play a major role in the transit country's economy meaning that many families simply depend upon money transfer from relatives who work abroad irregularly. Return may very well result in the destruction of their economic basis and their deterioration into poverty. Secondly, irregular migrants most often stem from remote or rural areas, but upon return, these migrants prefer to stay in or around the capital or major cities. Consequently, their families may leave their villages to join their relatives, in which case authorities are faced with internal migration and rapid urbanisation. Another important implication of return is re-emigration. At least in the case of forced return, many migrants look for possibilities to go abroad again because they lack an acceptable prospect in their home country. In all these dimensions, even the return of country's own nationals is a rather complex issue that brings about a lot of challenges for transit countries.
Third Country Nationals
Even more challenging is the return of third country nationals to transit countries.
Almost none of the transit countries around the EU has any experience in readmitting third country nationals to their home countries, and in most cases, readmission agreements with countries of origin are lacking. Because neither the governments of the transit countries nor relevant international organisations nor the EU itself are in a position to reliably predict the potential level of third country nationals that will be returned by EU member states, measures providing for the implementation of third Readmission agreements do not explicitly oblige the 'safe third country' to assure asylum seekers access to a fair refugee determination procedure in line with international standards. In addition, returning states might not even clarify that the individual is an asylum seeker who has been refused on formal grounds of the 'safe 10 UNHCR, 2001; Rogers and Peers, 2005. third country' rule. Chain deportation might be the consequence. Moreover, not only rejected asylum seekers but also irregular migrants can apply for asylum upon return, and it can be assumed that substantial numbers of irregular migrants have a severe claim for protection (for more details, see Kruse 2006) .
If one assumes that most of the transit countries are not 'safe third countries' of asylum according to UNHCR criteria, we can conclude that the return of rejected asylum seekers might imply a lowering of asylum standards below internationally accepted standards. The rights of asylum seekers -to have a minimum quality of living conditions during the procedure, to obtain necessary information, to have a transparent and fair procedure and to have access to an independent appeal process -might be violated on the part of EU member states.
In sum, readmission agreements mainly bring about negative consequences and Similarly, it seems to be unlikely at best that readmission agreements will function as a deterrent, or that they will substantially decrease the flow of irregular migrants into the EU so long as the problems that cause people to leave their countries and migrate towards the EU continue to persist.
4.
Conclusion
The aim of this paper has been to assess EC visa facilitation and readmission agreements in terms of objectives, substance and implications.
The analysis has considered that since the Eastern Enlargement, the EU has been searching for a proper balance between internal security and external stabilisation that is acceptable to all sides. In offering more relaxed travel conditions in exchange for signing an EC readmission agreement and reforming domestic justice and home affairs, the EU found a way to press for reforms in neighbouring countries while meeting a major source of discontent in these countries. Countries to strengthen their entry conditions and discontinue their practice of issuing visas either free of charge or for a low fee and on relatively uncomplicated terms. The EC visa facilitation agreements fall short of sufficiently compensating for these changed circumstances. In the context of readmission agreements, the most difficult issue to agree upon is the return of third country nationals and stateless persons. In this regard, three countries have reached concessions in terms of time. While Albania and Ukraine negotiated for a two-year transitional period before the obligations concerning the readmission of third-country nationals and stateless persons shall become applicable, Russia attained a three-year delay. Another important difference between agreements is whether they introduce an accelerated procedure for persons that have been apprehended in the border regions. The main advantage of readmission agreements from the EC's point of view is that the Community gets hold of a legal instrument that enables them to force transit countries to readmit not only their own, but also third country nationals. However, from the point of view of non-EC countries, EC readmission agreements only bring about negative consequences that, in the end, might put their economic, social and political stability at risk. Even more, the effectiveness of readmission agreements as a policy tool can only be considered on a very general basis because it is difficult to verify an individual's nationality, to prove migration routes, to further readmit third country nationals to their countries of origin and to reintegrate return migrants in their home country.
